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Abstract
We construct a model of a monetary union to study fiscal consolidation in the
Periphery of the Euro area, through cuts in public sector wages or hiring when the
nominal interest rate is constrained at its lower bound. Consolidation induces a posi-
tive wealth effect that increases demand, as well as a reallocation of workers towards
the private sector, which together boost private activity. However, in a low inflation
environment, demand is suppressed and the private sector is not able to absorb the
additional workers. Comparing the two instruments, cuts in public hiring increase un-
employment persistently in this environment, while wage cuts can reduce it. Regions
with higher mobility of labor between the two sectors are able to consolidate more
effectively. Price flexibility is also key at the zero lower bound: for a higher degree of
price rigidity in the Periphery, consolidation becomes harder to achieve. Consolidations
can be self-defeating when the public good is productive.
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1 Introduction
Fiscal consolidation policies implemented in the Euro area in recent years have placed special
emphasis on reducing the public wage bill, which represents a sizable component of the
government budget.1 The fall in the nominal government wage bill has been particularly
pronounced in Periphery countries of the Euro area, such as Ireland, Greece and Portugal
(see Figure 1), and has come from cuts in both wages and the number of employees in
the public sector (see Figure 2).2 At the same time, the Euro area has been experiencing
a prolonged period of inflation uncertainty: with monetary policy constrained by the zero
lower bound (ZLB henceforth), inflation has remained below the ECB’s medium run objective
for some time. This environment of low inflation has important implications for the design
and implementation of fiscal policy. This paper offers a positive analysis of the relative
effectiveness of cutting wages versus cutting hiring for reducing the public wage bill in a
monetary union when inflation is low.
Historically, periods of high inflation have been used to reduce debt-to-GDP ratios, for
example in many western countries following both the First and Second World War (Reinhart
et al. 2015). On the contrary, low inflation, all else equal, raises deficit- and debt-to-GDP
ratios by reducing the growth in nominal GDP. Debt dynamics would be left unchanged
if nominal interest rates adjust by the same magnitude as inflation, thus leaving real rates
unchanged. Instead, when nominal rates have hit the ZLB, falling inflation leads to rising
real interest rates, making it more difficult to reduce government debt-to-GDP ratios.
Recent studies, both theoretical and empirical, have looked at a less direct effect of low
inflation on fiscal policy, namely the impact of the ZLB on fiscal multipliers. Much of the
literature has found that fiscal multipliers are higher when monetary policy is constrained.3
1Before the crisis the government wage bill accounted, on average, for almost 25% of total public spending
and more than 10% of GDP, and almost 15% of the labor force in the Euro area was employed in the public
sector (see Holm-Hadulla et al. 2010).
2These policies have been implemented through reducing overtime pay, retrenching specific indemnities
or benefits, implementing attrition rules to reduce new hiring or simply by outright lay-offs and pay cuts.
In Greece, for example, a 10% cut across all public sector wages was legislated in 2010, followed by further
cuts. In Spain, the attrition rule allowed a new hire for every 10 exits.
3Eggertsson (2011), Christiano et al. (2011), Coenen et al. (2012) and De Long and Summers (2012) find
that the government spending multiplier increases significantly at the ZLB. Erceg and Linde (2013) show
that the magnitude of the output contraction induced by spending-based consolidation is roughly three times
larger when monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB. Ilzetzki et al. (2013) report substantially higher
multipliers in countries operating under fixed exchange rates, another form of constrained monetary policy.
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Based on this principle, several papers discuss the potential role of fiscal stimulus in allevi-
ating a ZLB crisis: Correia et al. (2013) suggest a stimulus strategy based on consumption
taxation, and Rendahl (2016) focuses on how expansionary fiscal policy can best exploit the
amplification of labor market movements at the ZLB. The converse of these arguments is
that attempting to carry out fiscal consolidation in a liquidity trap can be very costly, and
even self-defeating.
Another important interaction between fiscal and monetary policy is the fact that inflation
can have a different impact, both in terms of size and timing, across different components of
public expenditure and revenue. Jalil (2012) shows that the differences between the estimated
multipliers of government spending and taxation can be explained by the differential response
of monetary policy. Erceg and Linde (2013) find that, at the ZLB, a tax-based consolidation
is less costly in the short run than a spending-based consolidation, while the opposite is
true when monetary policy is unconstrained. McManus et al. (2014) demonstrate that the
ZLB has different effects on different fiscal consolidation instruments, and should therefore
be considered when designing fiscal policy. We extend this literature by comparing the
effectiveness of two different instruments for reducing the public wage bill at the ZLB and
compare them with traditional instruments of fiscal consolidation considered in the existing
literature.
We consider a New Keynesian model of a two-block monetary union, calibrated for the
Periphery and Core of the Euro area. In order to build a complete model of the labor market,
we incorporate both search and matching frictions, leading to involuntary unemployment, and
an endogenous labor force participation decision, leading to voluntary unemployment. We
allow the government to hire public employees to produce a public good. Following Erceg
and Linde (2013) and Pappa et al. (2015), we compare a given public debt consolidation
through two alternative fiscal instruments, namely public wage cuts and public vacancy cuts,
in normal times and in a low inflation environment.4
In normal times, cuts in the public wage bill using either instrument cause a reallocation
of labor towards the private sector, facilitating hiring and leading to a fall in the private wage
4An example of fiscal consolidation through the public wage bill in normal times comes from the German
economy. In 2000, spending cuts amounted in Germany to DM 30.1 billion or 0.75% of GDP, involving
mainly the public sector wage bill, social programs, and subsidies.
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in the medium run. This induces an internal devaluation: by increasing the competitiveness
of the private sector of the Periphery, the consolidation leads to a depreciation of the real
exchange rate. Together with the positive wealth effect of the cut in government spending,
which raises private demand, this boosts private output. Both types of consolidation bring
about a fall in the unemployment rate. Public wage cuts lead to a larger fall in unemployment
as the private sector quickly absorbs the increased share of jobseekers, while public vacancy
cuts lead to a more sluggish adjustment in the labor market. Comparing with the traditional
instruments of fiscal consolidation in the existing literature, both tax hikes and spending cuts
tend to decrease private output. Tax hikes reduce labor force participation, increasing the
private wage and marginal costs for firms. Spending cuts, although they crowd-in private
consumption and investment, they induce a reduction in labor supply, which leads to a fall
in vacancies and employment in the private sector, and counterbalances the positive wealth
effect of the consolidation.
In a low inflation environment, induced by negative demand shocks and a ZLB constraint
on monetary policy, the government debt-to-GDP ratio rises, and, hence, a significantly larger
cut in the public wage bill is required. Furthermore, with the contraction in demand, the
private sector is much more limited in its ability to absorb jobseekers leaving the public sector
job search, and private employment falls during the liquidity trap. Still, the reallocation of
jobseekers after a public wage cuts quickly reverses the path of private employment by reduc-
ing labor costs, and decreases unemployment in the medium run. Public vacancy cuts do not
induce a strong reallocation of jobseekers and reduce public employment more significantly.
As a result, vacancy cuts increase unemployment in the medium run. Again, standard fiscal
instruments would deepen the recession induced by the negative demand shocks relative to
consolidation through the public wage bill.
We run a series of alternative simulations to investigate the mechanisms at play in our
model. First, we find that the ability of jobseekers to reallocate their search is of key im-
portance: rigidities in the mobility of labor between the public and private sectors mitigate
the positive effects of the fiscal consolidation on private employment after the liquidity trap,
making consolidation itself more difficult to achieve. Second, price flexibility is crucial for the
success of the fiscal consolidation at the ZLB. When the degree of price stickiness in the Pe-
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riphery is assumed to be higher than in the Core, the internal devaluation channel is reversed,
making the consolidation harder to achieve. Third, looking at the role of the public good
in the economy, we find that consolidation in a low inflation environment is more difficult if
the public good is productive, such that the cut in public sector output has an effect on the
marginal product of private labor. Finally, concerning parameters related to the openness
of the Periphery, we show that lower elasticity of substitution between home-produced and
imported goods makes consolidation harder to achieve, whereas a bigger size of the block
implementing the consolidation implies that it becomes less costly.
Our work is related to a few recent articles. On the empirical side, our results are con-
sistent with the recent findings of Pe´rez et al. (2016), who show that while government wage
and employment reforms have adverse short term effects, such measures can yield medium to
long term benefits due to possible competitiveness gains, through spillover effects on private
sector wages, and efficiency gains, through their impact on labor market dynamics. Another
related paper is the empirical work of Lamo et al. (2016), who find that the contractionary
effects of employment cuts appear more damaging for the Spanish economy than those of
wage cuts. Using US data, Bermperoglou et al. (2017) find that public employment shocks
are mildly expansionary at the federal level and strongly expansionary at the state and local
level by crowding in private consumption and increasing labor force participation and pri-
vate sector employment. Similarly, state and local government wage shocks lead to increases
in consumption and output, while shocks to federal government wages induce significant
contractionary effects.
On the theoretical side, the literature has also investigated the impact of shocks in the
public sector on the level and volatility of employment and wages (see e.g. Quadrini and
Trigari (2007) and Gomes (2015)). Bradley et al. (2016) estimate a structural model with a
public sector and a labor market with search and matching frictions, using UK data. The
authors run simulations of austerity measures, such as a reduction in public sector hiring, an
increase in public sector lay-offs, and progressive and proportional cuts to the distribution
of wages in the public sector, that were implemented after the 2008 recession. In line with
our results away from the ZLB, they find that all policies increase hiring and turnover in
the private sector. In an earlier contribution, Demekas and Kontolemis (2000) developed a
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simple two-sector model of the labor market with endogenous unemployment, but without
explicit dynamics, showing that increases in government wages lead to increases in private
sector wages and higher unemployment, while increases in government employment do not
have a significant impact on unemployment. Similarly, Ardagna (2007) has shown that, in a
DSGE model with a unionized labor market, unions demand higher wages in response to a
debt-financed increase in public sector employment and wages, which leads to a fall in private
sector employment and a contraction in the economy. We extend the existing literature by
considering a DSGE model of a monetary union, and by explicitly incorporating the ZLB
and analyzing its consequences for the effects of cuts in the public wage bill.5
The remainder of the paper is organized follows. In Section 2, we provide the details of
the model. Section 3 discusses the results of the different policy experiments and Section 4
provides extensive sensitivity analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a DSGE model of a two-block monetary union with search and matching frictions,
endogenous labor force participation, and sticky prices in the short run. The two countries,
labeled Home and Foreign, are of sizes n and 1− n, respectively. The following subsections
describe the Home economy in more detail: the structure of the Foreign economy is analogous.
All variables are in per capita terms. Where necessary, the conventional ? denotes foreign
variables or parameters, and the subscripts h and f denote goods produced in the Home and
Foreign economy and their respective prices.
There are four types of firms in each block: (i) a government-owned firm that produces
the public good, (ii) private competitive firms that use labor and effective capital to produce
a non-tradable intermediate good, (iii) monopolistic retailers that transform the intermediate
good into a tradable good, and (iv) competitive final goods producers that use domestic and
foreign produced retail goods to produce a final, non-tradable good that is used for investment
5A link can also be established with the two-country model of a currency union in Kuvshinov et al. (2016).
The authors look at a deleveraging shock taking place in the Periphery and find that deleveraging generates
deflationary spillovers which cannot be contained by monetary policy, as it becomes constrained by the zero
lower bound.
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and consumption. Price rigidities arise at the retail level, while labor market frictions occur
in the intermediate goods sector. The representative household consists of private and public
employees, unemployed, and labor force non-participants. The government collects taxes and
issues debt to finance the wages of public employees, the cost of opening new vacancies in
the public sector and the provision of unemployment benefits.
2.1 Labor markets
We consider search and matching frictions in both the private and public labor markets.
In each period, jobs in each sector, j = p, g, are destroyed at a constant fraction σj and a
measure mj of new matches are formed. The evolution of employment in each sector is thus
given by:
njt+1 = (1− σj)njt +mjt (1)
We assume that σp > σg in order to capture the fact that, in general, public employment is
more permanent than private employment.6
The new matches are given by:
mjt = µ¯
j(υjt )
µ(ujt)
1−µ (2)
where υ and u are vacancies and jobseekers respectively, and the matching efficiency, µ¯j, can
differ in the two sectors. From the matching functions specified above we can define, for each
sector j, the probability of a jobseeker being hired, ψhjt , and of a vacancy being filled, ψ
fj
t :
ψhjt ≡
mjt
ujt
(3)
ψfjt ≡
mjt
υjt
(4)
6For example, Albrecht et al. (2015) and Gomes (2015) find empirical evidence that separation rates in
the public sector are lower than the private sector in the UK, US and Colombia, respectively.
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2.2 Households
The representative household consists of a continuum of infinitely lived agents. The members
of the household derive utility from leisure, which corresponds to the fraction of members
that are out of the labor force, lt, and a consumption bundle, ct. The instantaneous utility
function is, thus, given by:
U(ct, lt, xt) =
(ct − ζct−1)1−η
1− η + Φ
l1−ϕt
1− ϕ (5)
where η is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ζ is the parameter
determining habits in consumption, Φ > 0 is the relative preference for leisure and ϕ is the
inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
At any point in time, a fraction npt (n
g
t ) of the household members are private (public)
employees. Bruckner and Pappa (2012) and Campolmi and Gnocchi (2016) have added
a labor force participation choice in New Keynesian models of equilibrium unemployment.
Following Ravn (2008), the participation choice is modeled as a trade-off between the cost
of giving up leisure and the prospect of finding a job. In particular, the household chooses
the fraction of the unemployed actively searching for a job, ut, and the fraction which are
out of the labor force and enjoying leisure, lt. Normalising the size of the household to 1, the
composition of the household is given by:
npt + n
g
t + ut + lt = 1 (6)
The household chooses the fraction of jobseekers searching in each sector: a share st of
jobseekers look for a job in the public sector, while the remainder, (1− st), seek employment
in the private sector. That is, ugt ≡ stut and upt ≡ (1− st)ut.
The household owns the private capital stock, which evolves according to:
kpt+1 =
[
1− ω
2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2]
it + (1− δ(xt)) kpt (7)
where it is private investment, ω dictates the size of investment adjustment costs. Following
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Neiss and Pappa (2005), the depreciation rate, δ(xt), will depend on the degree of capital
utilization, xt, according to:
δ(xt) = δ¯x
ξ
t (8)
where δ¯ and ξ are positive constants.
The budget constraint, in real terms, is given by:
(1 + τ c) ct + it + bg,t+1 + etrf,t−1bf,t ≤
[
rkt − τ k
(
rkt − δ(xt)
)]
xtk
p
t + rt−1bg,t + etbf,t+1(9)
+ (1− τnt ) (wptnpt + wgtngt ) + but + Πpt + Tt
where wjt , j = g, p, are the real wages in the two sectors, r
k
t is the real return on effective
capital, b denotes unemployment benefits, Πpt are the profits of the monopolistic retailers,
discussed below, and τ c, τ k, τnt , and Tt represent taxes on private consumption, private
capital, labor income and lump-sum transfers, respectively. Government bonds are denoted
by bg,t, and pay the real return rt−1, while bf,t denote liabilities with the Foreign country.7
Although the nominal exchange rate is fixed, the interest rate on foreign assets, rf,t, is
still affected by consumer price inflation differentials between the two countries, which are
captured by the real exchange rate, et. In fact, we can define the gross nominal interest rate
at Home, Rt, through the Fisher equation:
rt =
Rt
Etpit+1
(10)
where pit is the gross consumer price inflation rate.
The problem of the household is to choose ct, ut, st, n
p
t+1, n
g
t+1, it, k
p
t+1, xt, bg,t+1 and
bf,t+1 to maximize lifetime utility subject to the budget constraint, (9), the law of motion of
employment in each sector, (1), taking the probability of finding a job as given, the law of
motion of capital, (7), the definition of capital depreciation, (8), and the composition of the
household, (6). The resulting first order conditions are provided in an online appendix.8
7Assuming government debt is only held by local households captures well the case of Periphery countries
like Italy and Spain, where the largest fraction of public debt is held domestically. An interesting extension
would be to allow for public debt to also be held externally.
8The online appendix can be found at https://me.eui.eu/evi-pappa/
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We can derive the marginal value of an additional private sector employee as:
V Hnpt = λctw
p
t (1− τnt )− Φl−ϕt + (1− σp)βEt(V Hnpt+1) (11)
where λct is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. Using (11) together with the
equivalent expression for the value of an additional public sector employee, the definition of
hiring rates, (3), and the first order condition with respect to st, we obtain:
Et
(
V Hng ,t+1
)
ψhgt = Et
(
V Hnp,t+1
)
ψhpt (12)
This equation shows that, in equilibrium, the expected value of searching in the two sectors is
equalized. This expected value will depend not only on the probability of finding a job in each
sector, ψhjt , but also on the expected utility from having an additional worker in each sector,
which, in turn, will depend on the respective wage in each sector and the separation rate, σj.
This means that a wage differential can arise between the two sectors in a non-degenerate
equilibrium if there are differences in the number of vacancies, the matching efficiency, or the
separation rate.
2.3 Production
2.3.1 Intermediate goods firms
Intermediate goods are produced with a Cobb-Douglas technology:
ypt = (n
p
t )
1−φ(xtk
p
t )
φ (13)
where kpt and n
p
t are private capital and labor inputs, and xt is the degree of capital utiliza-
tion.9
9The assumption of variable capital utilization here is important: note that, without it, all factors of
production would be predetermined, meaning that output cannot adjust on impact in response to shocks. In
this case, the nominal interest rate needs to adjust sharply to bring the economy to equilibrium. To illustrate
this, we present, in the appendix, the results of our model without variable capital utilization away from the
ZLB.
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Since current hires give future value to intermediate firms, the optimization problem is
dynamic and, hence, firms maximize the discounted value of future profits. The number of
workers currently employed, npt , is taken as given and the employment decision concerns the
number of vacancies posted in the current period, υpt , so as to employ the desired number
of workers next period, npt+1. Firms also decide the amount of the private capital, k
p
t , to be
rented from the household at rate rkt . The problem of an intermediate firm with n
p
t workers
currently employed can be written as:
Qp(npt ) = max
kpt ,υ
p
t
{
px,t(n
p
t )
1−φ(xtk
p
t )
φ − wptnpt − rkt xtkpt − κυpt + Et
[
Λt,t+1Q
p(npt+1)
]}
(14)
where px,t is the relative price of intermediate goods, κ is a utility cost associated with posting
a new vacancy, and Λt,t+1 = β
λct+1
λct
is the discount factor. The maximization takes place
subject to the private employment transition equation, where the firm takes the probability
of the vacancy being filled as given. The first order conditions with respect to capital and
vacancies are:
px,tφ
ypt
xtk
p
t
= rkt (15)
κ
ψfpt
= EtΛt,t+1[px,t+1(1− φ) y
p
t+1
npt+1
− wpt+1 + (1− σp)
κ
ψfpt+1
] (16)
According to (15) and (16) the value of the marginal product of private capital should equal
the real rental rate and the marginal cost of hiring an additional worker should equal the
expected marginal benefit. The latter includes the marginal productivity of labor minus
the wage plus the continuation value, knowing that with probability σp the match can be
destroyed.
The marginal value, for the firm, of an additional employee is:
V Fnpt ≡
∂Qp(npt )
∂npt
= px,t(1− φ)y
p
t
npt
− wpt +
(1− σp)κ
ψfpt
(17)
2.3.2 Retailers
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers indexed by i on the unit
interval. Retailers buy intermediate goods and differentiate them with a technology that
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transforms one unit of intermediate goods into one unit of retail goods, and, thus, the relative
price of intermediate goods, px,t, coincides with the real marginal cost faced by the retailers.
Let yi,t be the quantity of output produced by retailer i. These goods are aggregated into a
tradable good, which is given by:
yrt =
[∫ 1
0
(yi,t)
−1
 di
] 
−1
where  > 1 is the constant elasticity of demand for each variety of retail goods. The
aggregate tradable good is sold at a price Ph,t =
(∫
(Pi,h,t)
−1 di
) 1
−1 , where Pi,h,t is the price
of each variety i. The demand for each intermediate good depends on its relative price and
on aggregate demand:
yi,t =
(
Pi,h,t
Ph,t
)−
yrt (18)
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that in any given period each retailer can reset its price
with a fixed probability (1− χ). Firms that are able to reset their nominal price choose P ∗i,h,t
so as to maximize expected real profits given by:
Πt (i) = Et
∞∑
s=0
(βχ)s Λt,t+s
([
Pi,h,t
pt+s
− px,t+s
]
yi,t+s
)
subject to the demand schedule, (18), in each period. Since all firms are ex-ante identical,
P ∗i,h,t = P
∗
h,t for all i. The resulting expression for the real price p
∗
h,t ≡ P ∗h,t/Pt is:
p∗h,t
ph,t
=

(− 1)
Nt
Dt (19)
where:
Nt = px,tyrt + βχEtΛt,t+1 (pih,t+1)Nt+1 (20)
Dt = ph,tyrt + βχEtΛt,t+1 (pih,t+1)−1Dt+1 (21)
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ph,t ≡ Ph,t/Pt and pih,t denotes producer price inflation. Under the assumption of Calvo
pricing, the price index, in nominal terms, is given by:
(Ph,t)
1− = χ (Ph,t−1)
1− + (1− χ) (P ∗h,t)1− (22)
The aggregate tradable good is sold domestically and abroad:
yrt = yh,t + y
?
h,t (23)
where yh,t is the quantity of tradable goods sold domestically and y
?
h,t the quantity sold
abroad, and we have assumed the law of one price holds:
ph,t = etp
?
h,t (24)
2.3.3 Final Goods Producer
Finally, in each block, perfectly competitive firms produce a non-tradable final good by
aggregating domestic and foreign aggregate retail goods using CES technology:
yt =
[
($)
1
γ (yh,t)
γ−1
γ + (1−$) 1γ (τyf,t)
γ−1
γ
] γ
γ−1
where τ ≡ (1− n) /n normalizes the amount of imported goods at Home to per capita terms.
The home bias parameter, $, denotes the fraction of the final good that is produced at
home. The elasticity of substitution between home-produced and imported goods is given
by γ. Final good producers maximize profits yt − ph,tyh,t − pf,tτyf,t each period. Solving for
the optimal demand functions gives:
yh,t = $ (ph,t)
−γ yt (25)
yf,t = (1−$) (pf,t)−γ 1
τ
yt (26)
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The consumer price index, Pt, is defined by substituting out yh,t and yf,t in the CES above
by the respective demand curves, which yields:
P 1−γt = $ (Ph,t)
1−γ + (1−$) (Pf,t)1−γ (27)
2.4 Government
The government sector produces the public good using public capital and labor:
ygt = (n
g
t )
1−α(k¯g)α (28)
where α is the share of public capital, k¯g, which is assumed to be fixed. Government expen-
diture consists of public wages, public vacancy costs, unemployment benefits, consumption
expenditure and lump-sum transfers, while revenues come from the consumption, capital
income and labor income taxes. The government deficit is, therefore, defined by:
DFt = w
g
tn
g
t + κv
g
t + but + gt + Tt − τnt (wptnpt + wgtngt )− τ k(rkt − δt)xtkpt − τ cct
and the government budget constraint is given by:
bg,t +DFt =
bg,t+1
rt
(29)
When considering public wage bill cuts, the government has two potential fiscal instru-
ments, υg and wg. For comparison, we will also consider consolidation through traditional
fiscal instruments, labor income tax rates, τn, and government consumption expenditure, g.
The other tax rates, τ k and τ c, will be treated as parameters and not considered as potential
instruments. We consider each instrument separately, assuming that if one is active, the
other remains fixed at its steady state value. For Ψ ∈ {υg, wg, g, τn}, following Erceg and
Linde (2013) and Pappa et al. (2015), we assume fiscal rules of the form:
Ψt = Ψ
(1−βΨ0) ΨβΨ0t−1
( b˜g,t
b∗g,t
)βΨ1 (
∆b˜g,t+1
∆b∗g,t+1
)βΨ2(1−βΨ0) (30)
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where b˜g,t ≡ bg,trgdpt is the debt-to-GDP ratio and b∗g,t is the target debt-to-GDP ratio, given by
the AR(2) process:
log b∗g,t − log b∗g,t−1 = ρ2logb¯+ ρ1(log b∗g,t−1 − log b∗g,t−2)− ρ2 log b∗g,t−1 − εbt
where b¯ is the steady state debt-to-GDP level and εbt is a white noise process representing a
fiscal consolidation shock.
2.5 Closing the model
2.5.1 Monetary policy
There is a single independent monetary authority that sets the gross nominal interest rate
to target zero net inflation, subject to the ZLB:
R?t = Max
{
1, ρRR
?
t−1 + (1− ρR) ρpip˜it
}
(31)
where p˜it = npit + (1− n) pi?t . For the Home economy, consumer price inflation is defined as:
pit =
Pt
Pt−1
(32)
With fixed nominal exchange rates, the real exchange rate equals the ratio of consumer prices:
et =
P ?t
Pt
(33)
2.5.2 Resource constraint
The non-tradable domestic final good is sold for private and public consumption and for
investment, and is also used for the costs of vacancy postings:
yt = ct + it + gt + κ(υ
p
t + υ
g
t ) (34)
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In turn, following the national accounting identity, total output is defined as tradable output
plus the government wage bill:
rgdpt = ph,ty
r
t + w
g
tn
g
t (35)
Aggregating the budget constraint of households using the market clearing conditions,
the budget constraint of the government, and aggregate profits, we obtain the law of motion
for net foreign assets, which is given by:
et (rf,t−1bf,t − bf,t+1) = nxt (36)
and where nxt are net exports defined as:
nxt = ph,ty
?
h,t − pf,tτyf,t (37)
Finally, we introduce a risk premium charged to Home households depending on the
relative size of net foreign liabilities to real GDP:
rf,t = r
?
t exp
{
Γet
bf,t+1
rgdpt
}
(38)
where Γ is the elasticity of the risk premium with respect to the liabilities.
2.5.3 Wage bargaining
Private sector wages are determined by ex post (after matching) Nash bargaining. Workers
and firms split rents and the part of the surplus they receive depends on their bargaining
power. Denoting by ϑ ∈ (0, 1) the firms’ bargaining power, the Nash bargaining problem is
to maximize the weighted sum of log surpluses:
max
wpt
{
(1− ϑ) lnV Hnpt + ϑ lnV Fnpt
}
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where V Hnpt and V
F
npt are given by (11) and (17), respectively. The optimization problem leads
to the following solution for wpt :
wpt = (1− ϑ)px,t(1− φ)
ypt
npt
+
ϑ
(1− τnt )λc,t
Φl−ϕt (39)
Hence, the equilibrium wage is a weighted average of the marginal product of employment
and the disutility from labor, with the weights given by the firm and household’s bargaining
power, respectively.
2.6 Model Solution and Calibration
We solve the model by linearizing the equilibrium conditions around a non-stochastic steady
state in which all prices are flexible, the price of the private good is normalized to unity,
and inflation is zero. To account for the ZLB, which is a non-linear constraint, we use the
Occbin toolkit provided by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015). Following the literature, the
low inflation environment is induced by assuming a shock to the household’s discount rate,
%βt , in both countries. This shock contracts demand and causes inflation to fall across the
monetary union, driving the common nominal interest rate to its lower bound. By raising the
household’s propensity to save, the discount factor shock by itself induces a rise in investment.
To avoid this counterfactual behavior for investment, we also introduce a shock to the price
of investment, %it, that leads to a fall in investment.
10
The stochastic processes for these fluctuations are as follows:
%βt = (1− ρβ)%β + ρβ%βt−1 + βt
%it = (1− ρi)%i + ρi%it−1 + it
where we set ρβ = 0.6 and ρi = 0.85.
Table 1 shows the key parameters and steady state values targeted in our calibration. We
calibrate the model at a quarterly frequency and consider the Home economy to represent
the Periphery of the Euro area, consisting of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
10Responses for the low inflation environment without the investment shock are shown in the online ap-
pendix. The responses of variables other than investment are not qualitatively affected by this shock.
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Table 1: Calibration of Parameters and Steady State Values
Parameter/Variable Value Description
Preferences:
β 0.99 discount factor
η 1.00 intertemporal elasticity of substitution
ζ 0.70 habits in consumption
ϕ 4.00 inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply
$ 0.85 home bias in the Periphery
γ 1.50 elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods
Ratios:
n 30% relative size of Periphery
yp/rgdp 77% private output to GDP
Bg/rgdp 80% annual public debt to GDP
g/rgdp 8.3% government consumption to GDP
Labor Market:
(1− l) 65% labor force participation
u/(1− l) 12% unemployment rate
ug/u 20% share of jobseekers in the public sector
ng/n 18% share of public employment
b/(1− τn)wp 52.3% net replacement rate
κ/wp 7.29% vacancy costs as a share of wages
ψfp, ψfg 7% probability of vacancy filling (private, public)
σp 4.18% private job destruction rate
σg 0.95×σp public job destruction rate
µ 0.50 elasticity of matching wrt vacancies
Production:
ω 7.3 investment adjustment costs
ξ 2.15 elasticity of depreciation to changes in utilization
δ¯ 2% depreciation rate
φ, α 36% capital share (private, public)
 1.1 markup
χ 0.75 Calvo lottery
Policy:
ρR 0.85 interest rate inertia
ρpi 1.50 Taylor rule inflation targeting
ρ1 , ρ2 0.79, 0.0001 persistence debt target
βv0 , βv1 ,βv2 0.6, 3.4, 3 fiscal rule parameters for vacancy cuts
βw0 , βw1 ,βw2 0.85, 0.45, 0.3 fiscal rule parameters for wage cuts
Unless otherwise stated, parameter values are equal for both countries.
We follow Erceg and Linde (2013) and assume symmetry across the two blocks for most
parameters. However, because we set n = 0.3 and assume zero net foreign assets in the
steady state, the two blocks necessarily differ in the degree of home bias, $ and $?, which is
set to 0.85 in the Periphery and 0.94 in the Core. Again following Erceg and Linde (2013),
we set the elasticity between domestic and foreign consumption goods to 1.5, and set private
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output, yp, to represent 77% of GDP.
We choose an annual government debt-to-GDP ratio of 80%, significantly above the Maas-
tricht limit and, therefore, consistent with an environment in which fiscal consolidation is
deemed necessary. We set the share of government consumption to GDP equal to the average
share of government intermediate consumption to GDP in the European Periphery. We set
the steady state labor income tax rate at 30%, and set government consumption expenditure
at 80% of the public wage bill, in line with the euro area average.
The rest of the utility function parameters are standard. The intertemporal elasticity
of substitution is set to 1 and the habit parameter is set equal to 0.6 in order to increase
persistence and the duration of the lower bound. We assume a Frisch elasticity of labor
supply equal to 0.25.
We set the labor force participation rate to 65%, assume that 20% of jobseekers are search-
ing in the public sector, and that 18% of employed workers are working for the government.
For the remaining labor market parameters, we follow Moyen et al. (2016), who calibrate a
model for the Euro area with one block matching the Periphery. As such, the unemployment
rate is set to 12%, the net replacement rate to equal 52.3% and vacancy posting costs to
represent 7.29% of private wages. We assume equal probabilities of a vacancy to be filled in
both sectors, ψfp = ψfg = 7%. As discussed above, we assume that the average duration
of employment is shorter in the private sector, and therefore set the separation rate in the
public sector 5% lower than in the private sector.
The parameters in the production function are standard: the capital share is set to 0.36 in
both sectors. The depreciation rate implies an annual depreciation of 10% and the investment
adjustment costs are set equal to 7.3.11 We set the elasticity of capital depreciation to capital
utilization, ξ, such that capital utilization is 1 at steady state. Finally, we assume prices are
sticky for four quarters and that the central bank reacts only to deviations of inflation.
For the parameters governing fiscal policy, we set ρ1 and ρ2, which govern the path of the
debt-to-GDP target, such that any change in the target is observed fully after 30 quarters
and lasts for an arbitrarily long period of time, beyond the relevant policy horizon. Finally,
11We have investigated the sensitivity of our results to changes in this parameter. Lower values of ω imply
a higher initial drop in investment after the shock to its price and makes consolidation tougher for both
instruments.
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we set the parameters governing the fiscal instruments in equation (30) such that, in normal
times, the actual debt-to-GDP ratio meets the target after 30 quarters for both instruments.
3 Fiscal Consolidation through the Wage Bill
We consider a shock that drives the debt-to-GDP target 10% below its steady state. We
simulate the responses to this shock with either public vacancies, υg, or public wages, wg,
adjusting to achieve fiscal consolidation, and compare the effects of the consolidation under
these two instruments and under two alternative instruments, namely public consumption
spending, gt, and the labor income tax rate, τ
n
t , for the sake of comparison with the existing
literature. We first look at the effects of this shock in normal times, and then compare these
results to when the consolidation is implemented in a low inflation environment.
3.1 Consolidation in Normal Times
Figure 3 presents the comparison between cutting public vacancies and cutting public wages
to meet the new debt-to-GDP target, when the economy is not subject to the demand
shocks.12 For both instruments, the consolidation induces a gradual fall in the public wage
bill, and a contraction in public employment and, hence, public output. In the case of public
vacancies, the reduction in the public wage bill has a slight lag relative to the wage cuts,
due to the lag in the adjustment of public employment. Crucially, for both instruments,
the share of public sector jobseekers in total jobseekers falls. In the case of public vacancy
cuts, there is a fall in the number of matches, and hence the probability of finding a job
in the public sector. The public wage cuts cause the value of the public sector job, in the
case of a match, to fall. As a result, in both cases, the expected value of searching for a job
in the public sector is reduced. Since agents redirect their search until the expected value
of searching in each sector is equalized, this leads to a reallocation of jobseekers towards
the private sector.13 With public wages as the active instrument, this mechanism induces
12All responses are in percent deviations from steady state, except for interest rates and inflation, which
are in annualized levels, the share of public jobseekers, which is in percentage point deviation from steady
state, and net exports, which are in levels.
13Note that, in equilibrium, the expected value of searching for a job will be lower in both sectors.
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an endogenous reduction in public employment, which further aids the consolidation. In
contrast, public vacancies need to adjust a lot more to achieve a similar fall in the public
wage bill, since in this case public wages are assumed to be fixed.
The reduction in expenditure on the public wage bill creates a positive wealth effect
for the household, which leads to falling labor force participation and hence lower labor
supply. In the short run, this raises private wages. Nonetheless, the increase in the supply
of labor in the private sector, due to the reallocation of jobseekers, eventually pushes down
on private wages. Hence, by increasing the competitiveness of the Periphery within the
monetary union, consolidation induces an internal devaluation, and so implies a depreciation
of the real exchange rate and eventually a rise in net exports.
The rise in demand for the private good, and the fall in private wages, also imply a rise
in private vacancies. The expansion of both the demand and supply of private labor raises
private employment. As the labor markets adjust, the faster response of private employment
in the case of public wage cuts means that remaining jobseekers are absorbed into private
employees, and unemployment continues to fall. On the other hand, in the case of vacancy
cuts, the sluggish response of the private sector labor market means that fewer jobseekers
are hired. Along with the fact that public employment falls by much more in the medium
to long run, this implies that the unemployment rate falls less noticeably when vacancy cuts
are the active instrument.
Recalling the definition of GDP as the sum of private and public output, with the latter
measured by the public wage bill, we can see that the consolidation process initially boosts
GDP following the increase in private sector output, but then depresses GDP for many
periods, given the fall in the public wage bill. In the short to medium run, this effect is
somewhat bigger for wage cuts, given the larger increase in tradable output. The long run
effect on tradable output is higher for vacancy cuts, which mitigates the fall in real GDP
relative to public wage cuts.
Although our model differs substantially from Bradley et al. (2016), we also find that in
normal times cuts in the public wage bill expand the private sector, both by raising demand
and causing a reallocation of jobseekers to the private sector. We have also underlined
an additional mechanism not considered in Bradley et al. (2016), namely that for both
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instruments the public wage bill cut in a monetary union induces an internal devaluation,
therefore aiding the recovery by raising external demand. Comparing the two instruments,
cutting public wages implies a faster expansion in the private sector, and hence a larger fall in
unemployment. Public vacancy cuts, on the other hand, imply an overall larger cut in public
employment and a significantly more sluggish response of workers, such that the positive
effects in the private sector take longer to materialize.
To gain some more insight about the nature of the consolidation we consider relative to
the existing literature, we also plot in Figure 3 the responses of the economy when debt con-
solidation is achieved through the traditional fiscal instruments, namely public consumption
spending and labor income taxes. With both wages and vacancies in the public sector kept
fixed, these alternative instruments do not affect public employment or the allocation of job-
seekers in the two sectors. In the case of government spending cuts, there is a positive wealth
effect that leads to an increase in private consumption and a fall in labor force participation,
as in the case of public wage bill cuts. The exit of jobseekers from the labor force also lowers
the unemployment rate. This inward shift in labor supply induces an increase in real wages
and firms’ marginal costs which, together with the fall in spending, induces labor demand,
and therefore private vacancies, to fall. Coupled with the fact that unemployed jobseekers
do not switch sector, this induces a fall in private employment, and hence in tradable output
and real GDP. As standard in the existing literature, and in contrast to cuts to the public
wage bill, government spending multipliers are found to be positive.
The rise in the labor tax rate also lowers labor force participation substantially, by directly
reducing the incentives to work. Since consumption also falls in this case, given the drop in
after-tax income, this leads to a bigger drop in private vacancies, and hence larger negative
effects on private employment and tradable output. Responses are significantly larger and
more persistent than in the case of consumption spending cuts, due to a fall in investment.
Furthermore, the rise in labor taxes increases unemployment after the short run and reduces
the competitiveness of the Periphery leading to a real exchange rate appreciation, unlike all
of the spending based consolidations.
22
3.2 Consolidation in a Low Inflation Environment
We now turn to the case where the consolidation occurs while monetary policy is constrained
at the ZLB and inflation is stuck below steady state. Figures 4 and 5 plot the IRFs for
vacancy cuts and wage cuts, respectively. In each figure, to aid comparison, we again plot
the baseline consolidation in normal times in the blue solid lines, as in Figure 3.
For completeness, we also plot the case where the economy is hit by the negative demand
shocks but the ZLB constraint is not imposed: these are the green dashed lines. In both
Figures, in this unconstrained case the net nominal interest rate becomes negative for around
five quarters. This depresses the real interest rate, offsetting the effects of the negative
demand shocks through a smaller fall in private consumption and investment. It is interesting
to note that the fall in the real interest rate is actually a boost to public finances, and
the government’s debt-to-GDP ratio quickly falls close to the target with only a smaller
adjustment in the fiscal instruments needed.
Conversely, when the ZLB is imposed, shown by the red dash-dotted lines, the nominal
rate remains at its lower bound for around five quarters: the real interest rate is higher
than the unconstrained case and inflation falls by more. The contraction of tradable output,
coupled with the fall in inflation, push the government’s debt-to-GDP ratio in an upward
trajectory, in spite of the consolidation. Hence, a much larger adjustment of the fiscal in-
strument is needed in this environment, and in fact the target is not fully reached after 30
quarters.
At the ZLB, with both consumption and investment contracting, private vacancies fall
sharply and the private sector is no longer able to absorb the increasing number of private
jobseekers. In fact, the share of jobseekers in the public sector rises on impact in the case
of cuts in public vacancies. As a result, in the short run, private employment falls and the
unemployment rate rises, in line with the recent experience of countries in the Periphery of
the Euro area. As the consolidation in the public sector deepens, in the medium to long
run, we again see a shift of jobseekers to the private sector, a rise in private vacancies, and a
rise in private employment. Tradable output follows a similar path, contracting in the short
to medium run, but rising above steady state in the long run. Real GDP also falls sharply
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during the liquidity trap, and remains persistently below steady state due to the larger fall
in the public wage bill.
What does the low inflation environment imply about the comparison of fiscal instru-
ments? In Figure 6 we plot together the responses for the diferent instruments when the
ZLB constraint is binding. Compared to Figure 3, we see that the responses for cuts in
public vacancies and cuts in public wages are now relatively closer in general, and, particu-
larly, for tradable output and real GDP. This comes about because the relatively larger size
of the demand shocks dominates the shape of most responses. The most striking difference
is in unemployment: after the impact period, the unemployment rate falls substantially in
the case of wage cuts, while it remains elevated in the case of vacancy cuts. This difference
stems mainly from the weaker performance of private employment, and the larger fall in
public employment. Hence, in terms of the response of unemployment and the private sector
employment, the effects of public wage cuts are less adverse than those of vacancy cuts in a
low inflation environment.14
Again, in Figure 6 we compare consolidation in the public wage bill with consolidations
through standard cuts in government consumption or tax hikes. As we have seen above,
when the consolidation is implemented at the ZLB, the fall in demand causes a contraction
in the private sector, pushing down on both private sector wages and vacancies. When wages
and vacancies in the public sector do not adjust, this increases the incentives of jobseekers to
search in the public sector, and we see a sizable reallocation of labor towards the public sector.
This leads to large and persistent fall in both private employment and tradable output with
the traditional fiscal instruments. Hence, in a low inflation environment, the contraction in
the public sector through cuts in public vacancies or public wages helps the economy recover
in the medium run, while traditional consolidation instruments do not.
14In exercises we do not show here for economy of space, we find that the increase in unemployment
following vacancy cuts can be mitigated by assuming a lower Frisch elasticity. Nonetheless, these results are
robust for reasonable values, 0.1 ≤ 1ϕ ≤ 1, and do not affect our conclusions regarding the effects of wage
cuts versus vacancy cuts for reducing the unemployment rate.
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3.3 The Role of the Consolidation Shock
Since we are considering simultaneous shocks, it is useful to separate their effects. To this
end, we now compare the responses of the economy at the ZLB, as discussed above, to a case
where the economy hits the ZLB but the public debt target is held constant. The comparison
is shown in Figures 7a and 7b for vacancy cuts and wage cuts, respectively, with the blue
solid lines reporting the scenario with the consolidation shock and the green dashed lines the
one without.
For both policy instruments, consolidation is, in fact, induced by the negative demand
shocks alone. As discussed above, by inducing a fall in inflation and a contraction in the
private sector, the demand shocks increase the debt-to-GDP ratio above the target. As a
result, and according to the fiscal rule specified in equation (30), public vacancies or wages
are automatically cut, even without the fall in the debt-to-GDP target. Nonetheless, these
cuts are smaller compared to the scenario with the consolidation shock. Importantly, this
means that there is a smaller reallocation of jobseekers to the private sector after the initial
impact of the negative demand shocks. Due to the drop in private demand, now households
initially reallocate jobseekers towards the public sector for both instruments. This leads to a
smaller depreciation of the real exchange rate, and a bigger fall in private consumption. The
fall in investment is also noticeably larger. The response of private employment now becomes
persistently negative. Along with the implied smaller drop in labor force participation, this
means that, for both instruments, the unemployment rate is higher without the consolidation
shock, too. Hence, we conclude that at the ZLB the consolidation shock aids the recovery of
the economy.
4 Sensitivity Analysis
We now perform different exercises to investigate how the mechanisms of the model affect
our results at the ZLB. First, we explore the role of labor market rigidities, by assuming that
the household cannot reallocate jobseekers between the two sectors.15 Second, we investigate
15We have also investigated the effects of wage rigidity in the private sector, assuming that private real
wages evolve as in Monacelli et al. (2010). These results are available in the online appendix. In line with
Krause and Lubik (2007), sticky wages do not seem to substantially affect any of our previous conclusions.
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the importance of price rigidities for the effects of fiscal consolidation. Third, we consider
the alternative scenario in which the public good is used in private production. Finally, we
test the sensitivity of our results with regards to the parameters that determine the openness
of the economy.
4.1 Fixed Allocation of Jobseekers
Our analysis has highlighted the role of the labor market channels in driving the effects of
fiscal consolidation through public wage bill cuts. We now explore the extent to which mut-
ing the reallocation of unemployed jobseekers between the two sectors, affects our findings.
Letting households choose the fraction of unemployed workers that look for a job in each of
the two sectors is important for the dynamics of our model. This assumption implies that
jobseekers can costlessly optimize their search between sectors in each period. However, in
reality, human capital derived from learned skills, past experience and in-job networking in-
troduce an asymmetry to the mobility of workers. Hence jobseekers with previous experience
in one sector would find it more difficult to be hired in the other. To explore the conse-
quences of imperfect mobility, we impose that the fraction of jobseekers in the public sector,
st, is held fixed at steady state. Hence, although the number of workers employed in each
sector can evolve separately through the dynamics of vacancy postings, matches, and labor
force participation, households cannot freely decide to reallocate jobseekers to one particular
sector.
The green dashed lines in Figures 8a and 8b depict the responses under this scenario.
With no reallocation of jobseekers to the private sector, the recovery is now much slower.
Firstly, as debt-to-GDP falls more slowly after the liquidity trap, larger and more persistent
cuts in public vacancies and wages are needed for consolidation. In fact, the target now takes
significantly longer to be met. Output and unemployment effects become more adverse. This
mechanism is particularly important for wage cuts, where, without the rise of jobseekers in the
private sector, private employment now does not increase. Nonetheless, the unemployment
rate continues to fall, since public employment does not fall, and labor force participation
falls persistently, as lower wages mean that household members find it optimal to stay at
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home and enjoy leisure.
Overall, rigidities in the reallocation of jobseekers from the public to the private sector
imply that fiscal consolidation through cuts in the public wage bill is more difficult to imple-
ment, and comes at the cost of higher unemployment in the case of vacancy cuts, and lower
private employment in the case of wage cuts.
4.2 Price Rigidities
We have seen that fiscal consolidation through the public wage bill induces changes in relative
prices, which, under a fixed exchange rate regime, plays a role in the reallocation of resources
within the monetary union. This is particularly true at the ZLB, when monetary policy
cannot undo changes in relative prices induced by asymmetric fiscal shocks and, as a result,
the degree of price stickiness becomes important for the effects of fiscal consolidation.
The green dashed lines in Figures 9a and 9b depict the responses when we assume that
the degree of price rigidities increases for both regions by setting χ = 0.85. It is clear that
price rigidities matter for the success of the consolidation at the ZLB. The larger the share
of firms that cannot change their prices on impact, the weaker the negative effects of the
demand shocks on inflation and the milder the necessary consolidation. However, this result
is reversed when the degree of price stickiness is asymmetric between member states. The red
dotted lines in Figures 9a and 9b depict the responses when we assume that the degree of price
rigidities increases only in the Periphery. In this case, consolidation effort decreases in the
short run as inflation moves less than in the benchmark model. Still, higher price stickiness in
the Periphery implies larger effects from the negative demand shocks. The relative inability
of prices to adjust in the Periphery induces a reversal of the internal devaluation, meaning
an appreciation of the real exchange rate, which significantly reduces net exports. This effect
is then mirrored in the response of tradable output and employment.16
Overall, a higher degree of price rigidities in the Periphery implies an additional channel,
which operates through an appreciation of the real exchange rate, with adverse effects on net
16In the online appendix we show that asymmetries in wage stickiness, or in the mobility of jobseekers across
sectors, are less important for our results. We also show that the degree of price stickiness is inconsequential
during normal times, as monetary policy will always react to undo possible rigidities stemming from price
dispersion.
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exports, output, private employment, and unemployment.
4.3 The Productivity of the Public Good
So far, we have assumed that the public good, ygt , does not play any role in the economy. As
an alternative, following Barro (1990) and Turnovsky (1999), we allow the public good, ygt ,
to enter the production function, taken as exogenous by the firms. To this end, we augment
the private production function to:
ypt = (n
p
t )
1−φ(xtk
p
t )
φ(ygt )
ν (40)
The parameter ν regulates how the public input affects private production: when ν is zero,
the government good is unproductive. This parameter is crucial in determining the effects
of consolidation, even in normal times. When ν > 0, fiscal consolidation in this environment
reduces the productive capacity of the firms by reducing the public good, and at the same
time induces a positive wealth effect, which raises private demand and therefore private labor
demand. Hence, ν is at the center of the balance between two opposite effects on private
production.
The green dashed lines in Figures 10a and 10b compare the responses of the baseline model
against the responses when we assume that ν = 0.15. When the public good is productive,
the reduction in the public wage bill implies a drop in the marginal product of labor, and this
leads to a bigger fall in private wages. For both instruments, there is a bigger contraction in
household consumption and investment, and ultimately a much larger and more persistent
drop in tradable output. In the case of vacancy cuts, where public employment, and hence
public output, falls more significantly, the differences are much starker. In this case, the
reallocation of jobseekers towards the private sector in the medium to long run is smaller,
since the expected return from working in the private sector is now smaller. Similarly,
the fact that the consolidation reduces the productivity of private jobs lowers the expected
returns from an additional hire for the firm, and, as a result, private vacancies fall more
in this case, inducing a bigger drop in private employment. More specifically, the initial
drop in private employment is larger and its subsequent evolution is always below baseline,
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raising the unemployment rate considerably and persistently. With public wage cuts, since
public employment does not fall by as much when compared to the case of vacancy cuts,
this channel of amplification through the productivity of the public good is less important.
The fact that the consolidation decreases private productivity also implies that there is no
internal devaluation after vacancy cuts: the real exchange rate even appreciates after the
liquidity trap.17
In summary, when the public good is productive, there is a bigger fall in the private
wage, consumption, investment, and tradable output. For vacancy cuts, the impact on the
responses of private employment and the unemployment rate is more pronounced.
4.4 Particularities of the Open Economy
In this section we explore the open economy dimension of the model, in particular investigat-
ing the sensitivity of our findings to changes in the degree of trade elasticity and the relative
size of the member country implementing consolidation within the monetary union.
4.4.1 Elasticity of Trade
There is no strong consensus from the empirical literature regarding the value of the elasticity
of substitution between home-produced and imported goods, γ. Some recent contributions
have suggested low values for this parameter, in some cases with estimates well below one.
The green dashed lines in Figures 11a and 11b show the IRFs for the case when this elasticity
is reduced from 1.5 to 0.5, implying complementarity between traded goods.
With the foreign and domestic goods as complements, the internal devaluation no longer
leads to a substitution of both domestic and foreign demand towards the domestically pro-
duced good. Instead, it contracts demand for both types of goods in the Periphery. The
fall in domestic demand produces a larger fall in domestic inflation, resulting in a bigger
exchange rate depreciation and a larger rise in net exports.18 The deflationary pressures
17In results we present in the online appendix we show that assuming that the public good provides utility
to the households by being a substitute of private consumption does not significantly affect our baseline
results.
18The results of the fall in domestic demand are clearly illustrated in the online appendix where we plot
the sensitivity of results to changes in the trade elasticity in normal times. For a lower elasticity of trade,
consumption and investment fall after the consolidation since agents cannot substitute domestic for foreign
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increase the debt burden, rendering consolidation more difficult to achieve and increasing its
associated costs. Note in particular that, for vacancy cuts, the unemployment rate increases
significantly when domestic and foreign goods are assumed to be complements.
In conclusion, complementarity between home-produced and imported goods implies that
the deflationary pressures increase the debt burden, rendering consolidation more costly.
4.4.2 The Relative Size of Member Countries
The red dash-dotted lines in Figures 11a and 11b show the implications of increasing the
size of the Periphery to 50% of the monetary union. Since we assume that net foreign assets
are zero in the steady state, increasing the size of the Periphery also implies reducing the
home bias in the Core.19 Hence the differences in the composition of CPI across regions are
smaller, CPI differentials are reduced and this dampens the adjustment of the real exchange
rate. Furthermore, although final good producers in the Periphery still substitute between
domestic and foreign retail goods, their demand now represents a bigger share of total demand
for foreign goods and, therefore, affects foreign prices more. In the short to medium run, this
benefits firms in the Periphery, and it translates to a slightly smaller adjustment in private
demand, particularly in investment. This, in turn, helps the consolidation effort and reduces
the adjustment of both fiscal instruments required to meet the debt target.
Hence, we conclude that it is easier to consolidate for larger countries in a monetary
union, although the associated relative differences are small.
5 Conclusions
5.1 Summary
In this paper, we have set up a DSGE model of a monetary union with search and matching
frictions, nominal rigidities, and public employment, to study the effects of fiscal consolidation
through cuts in the public wage bill in a low inflation environment. Our model allows us
to study non-trivial reallocation of agents both in and out of the labor force and between
goods and this results in downward pressures on inflation.
19For n = 0.5 and $ = 0.85, we have $? = 0.85
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the public and private sector. In normal times, a reduction in the government wage bill
induces a reallocation of labor towards the private sector, due to the contraction in the
public sector, and so pushes down on private wages in the medium run. This leads to an
internal devaluation within the monetary union, which, along with the positive wealth effect
from the cut in government expenditure, raises aggregate demand and so implies an expansion
in the private sector.
In a low inflation environment, induced by negative demand shocks, the debt-to-GDP
ratio rises, and so larger fiscal cuts are needed to lower this ratio. Given the expansionary
effects this has for the private sector, consolidation helps the recovery of the economy in a
liquidity trap in the medium to long run. Nonetheless, with the contraction in demand, the
private sector is much more limited in its ability to absorb the workers leaving the public
sector, and so the expansionary effects of the consolidation are contained. On the other hand,
the effects of consolidation on the unemployment rate depend on the fiscal instrument used
at the ZLB: while public wage cuts quickly and effectively reduce the unemployment rate,
public vacancy cuts lead to a significant and more persistent rise in the unemployment rate.
5.2 Policy Implications
Our findings can be used as a roadmap for successful fiscal consolidations through cuts in
the public wage bill. First, since vacancy cuts have indirect and lagged effects on the dy-
namics of the private wage and no effects for the public wage, they could be more easily
implemented. In normal times, they also decrease unemployment relative to wage cuts and,
moreover, generate more persistent increases in employment, output and net exports. Clearly,
in terms of implementability but also long run effects, consolidating through vacancy cuts in
normal times presents certain advantages. At the ZLB, the two instruments deliver similar
outcomes apart from unemployment that decreases for wage cuts and remains high for va-
cancy cuts. This creates a trade-off for policy makers that must strike a balance between the
easier implementation of unfavourable policies using vacancy cuts, or controlling the rise in
unemployment due to the negative demand shocks using wage cuts.
We point to several factors that matter for the recovery from the low inflation environ-
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ment. The most important are rigidities in the mobility of unemployed jobseekers between
the public and private sectors and nominal price stickiness. Rigidities in the reallocation of
workers between the two sectors make consolidation through cuts in the public wage bill more
adverse and come at the cost of higher unemployment in the medium to long run. Hence,
the presence of active labor market policies that can help channel workers from the public to
the private sector are crucial for the success of fiscal consolidations like the ones considered
in this paper. In a similar sense, relative price rigidities are also important: higher price
stickiness in the Periphery reverses the internal devaluation and leads instead to an appre-
ciation of the real exchange rate, which reinforces the negative effects of the demand shocks
and makes consolidation harder to achieve. Also in this case, structural reforms that reduce
those types of rigidities would ease consolidations in the Periphery. Furthermore, when the
public good which is being cut is a productive factor for the private sector, consolidation is
more difficult, since it reduces the marginal productivity of labor. This pushes down both on
firm’s demand for labor and household’s supply of labor in the private sector, and results in
a drag on the economy. Thus, policymakers should consider not only the number, but also
the quality, of workers when cutting jobs, and the sector in which pay cuts are implemented.
Also, we have compared consolidations through the public wage bill with traditional
instruments of fiscal consolidation considered in the existing literature, like tax hikes or
government consumption cuts. Public wage cuts continue to offer certain advantages in
terms of a fast recovery of the private sector and a reduction in the unemployment rate.
Still in a low inflation environment, even such a consolidation policy, cannot fully undo the
negative effects of the demand shocks.
References
Albrecht, J., Robayo-Abril, M. and Vroman, S.: 2015, Public Sector Employment in an
Equilibrium Search and Matching Model, Manuscript .
Ardagna, S.: 2007, Fiscal policy in unionized labor markets, Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control 31(5), 1498 – 1534.
32
Barro, R. J.: 1990, Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth, Journal
of Political Economy 98(5), S103–26.
Bermperoglou, D., Pappa, E. and Vella, E.: 2017, The government wage bill and private
activity, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 79, 21–47.
Bradley, J., Postel-Vinay, F. and Turon, H.: 2016, Public sector wage policy and labor market
equilibrium: a structural model, Journal of European Economic Association (forthcoming).
Bruckner, M. and Pappa, E.: 2012, Fiscal expansions, unemployment, and labor force par-
ticipation: theory and evidence, International Economic Review 53(4), 1205–1228.
Campolmi, A. and Gnocchi, S.: 2016, Labor market participation, unemployment and mon-
etary policy, Journal of Monetary Economics 79, 17–29.
Christiano, L., Eichenbaum, M. and Rebelo, S.: 2011, When Is the Government Spending
Multiplier Large?, Journal of Political Economy 119(1), 78–121.
Coenen, G., Erceg, C. J., Freedman, C., Furceri, D., Kumhof, M., Lalonde, R., ... and
Trabandt, M.: 2012, Effects of Fiscal Stimulus in Structural Models, American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics 4(1), 22–68.
Correia, I., Farhi, E., Nicolini, J. and Teles, P.: 2013, Unconventional Fiscal Policy at the
Zero Bound, American Economic Review 103(4), 1172–1211.
De Long, J. and Summers, L.: 2012, Fiscal Policy in a Depressed Economy, Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity pp. 233–297.
Demekas, D. G. and Kontolemis, Z. G.: 2000, Government employment and wages and labour
market performance, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 62(3), 391–415.
Eggertsson, G.: 2011, What Fiscal Policy is Effective at Zero Interest Rates?, NBER Macroe-
conomics Annual 2010 25, 59–112.
Erceg, C. and Linde, J.: 2013, Fiscal Consolidation in a Currency Union: Spending Cuts vs.
Tax Hikes, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 37(2), 422–445.
33
Gomes, P.: 2015, Optimal public sector wages, The Economic Journal 125(587), 1425–1451.
Guerrieri, L. and Iacoviello, M.: 2015, OccBin: A toolkit for solving dynamic models with
occasionally binding constraints easily, Journal of Monetary Economics 70(C), 22–38.
Holm-Hadulla, F., Kamath, K., Lamo, A., Pe´rez, J. J. and Schuknecht, L.: 2010, Public
wages in the euro area: towards securing stability and competitiveness, ECB Occasional
Paper (112).
Ilzetzki, E., Mendoza, E. and Vegh, C.: 2013, How Big (Small?) Are Fiscal Multipliers?,
Journal of Monetary Economics 60(2), 239–254.
Jalil, A.: 2012, Comparing Tax and Spending Multipliers: It’s All About Controlling for
Monetary Policy, Available at SSRN 2139855 .
Krause, M. U. and Lubik, T. A.: 2007, The (ir) relevance of real wage rigidity in the new
keynesian model with search frictions, Journal of Monetary Economics 54(3), 706–727.
Kuvshinov, D., Mu¨ller, G. J. and Wolf, M.: 2016, Deleveraging, deflation and depreciation
in the euro area, European Economic Review 88, 42–66.
Lamo, A., Moral-Benito, E. and Pe´rez, J. J.: 2016, Does slack influence public and private
labor market interactions?, Working Paper Series 1890, European Central Bank.
McManus, R., Ozkan, F. G. and Trzeciakiewicz, D.: 2014, Self-defeating austerity at the zero
lower bound, Department of Economics, University of York .
Monacelli, T., Perotti, R. and Trigari, A.: 2010, Unemployment fiscal multipliers, Journal of
Monetary Economics 57, 531–553.
Moyen, S., Sta¨hler, N. and Winkler, F.: 2016, Optimal Unemployment Insurance and In-
ternational Risk Sharing, Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-054, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Neiss, K. S. and Pappa, E.: 2005, Persistence without too much price stickiness: the role of
variable factor utilization, Review of Economic Dynamics 8(1), 231–255.
34
Pappa, E., Sajedi, R. and Vella, E.: 2015, Fiscal Consolidation with Tax Evasion and Cor-
ruption, Journal of International Economics 96(S1), 56–75.
Pe´rez, J. J., Aouriri, M., Campos, M. M., Celov, D., Depalo, D., Papapetrou, E., Pesliakaite,
J., Ramos, R. and Rodr´ıguez-Vives, M.: 2016, The fiscal and macroeconomic effects of
government wages and employment reform, Occasional Papers 1607, Banco de Espana.
Quadrini, V. and Trigari, A.: 2007, Public employment and the business cycle, The Scandi-
navian Journal of Economics 109(4), 723–742.
Ravn, M.: 2008, The consumption-tightness puzzle, NBER International Seminar on
Macroeconomics 2006 pp. 9–63.
Reinhart, C., Reinhart, V. and Rogoff, K.: 2015, Dealing with Debt, Journal of International
Economics 96(S1), 43–55.
Rendahl, P.: 2016, Fiscal Policy in an Unemployment Crisis, Review of Economic Studies
83(3), 1189–1224.
Turnovsky, S. J.: 1999, Productive government expenditure in a stochastically growing econ-
omy, Macroeconomic Dynamics 3, 544–570.
Figures
35
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
70
80
90
100
110
 
 
BE DE FR NL AT FI IE GR ES IT PT
Figure 1: Evolution of the Public Wage Bill
Wages and salaries in the public sector, current prices. For comparability, country series have been
normalized to 100 in 2009. Source: Eurostat and authors’ calculations.
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Figure 7: The Role of Consolidation at the Zero Lower Bound
Responses are in percent deviations from steady state, except for interest rates and inflation, which are in annualized levels, the
share of public jobseekers, which is in percentage point deviation from steady state, and net exports, which are in levels.
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Figure 8: Labor Market Rigidities at the Zero Lower Bound
Responses are in percent deviations from steady state, except for interest rates and inflation, which are in annualized levels, the
share of public jobseekers, which is in percentage point deviation from steady state, and net exports, which are in levels.
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Figure 9: Higher Price Stickiness (PS) at the Zero Lower Bound
Responses are in percent deviations from steady state, except for interest rates and inflation, which are in annualized levels, the
share of public jobseekers, which is in percentage point deviation from steady state, and net exports, which are in levels.
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Figure 10: The Role of the Public Good at the Zero Lower Bound
Responses are in percent deviations from steady state, except for interest rates and inflation, which are in annualized levels, the
share of public jobseekers, which is in percentage point deviation from steady state, and net exports, which are in levels.
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Figure 11: The Role of Openness at the Zero Lower Bound
Responses are in percent deviations from steady state, except for interest rates and inflation, which are in annualized levels, the
share of public jobseekers, which is in percentage point deviation from steady state, and net exports, which are in levels.
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